Revolution in South Asia

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Nepal: Maoist Leaders Demand India Return Occupied Land

Posted by Ka Frank on January 12, 2010

This article was published on Telegraph Nepal on January 11, 2010.

Fight for National Independ-ence has begun: Nepal Maoists leaders

Our fight is not against India, we are fighting for our national independence.

  • We will continue our struggle until India returns our occupied lands with dignity and honor
  • We do not want an inch extra from India, however, we will not let India occupy even an inch of our land
  • British Colonial mindset is still prevalent in Indian leadership
  • We demand scrapping of all unequal treaties with India
  • We have been cheated in Gandak, Koshi and we are going to be cheated again in Mahakali
  • I would have been the prime minister until death if I had compromised
  • After Sugauli Treaty, 1816, Nepal tuned into an semi-colonial state of India
  • Nepal Integration by Prithivi Naryan Shah was necessary
  • If Prithivi Narayan Shan would have been alive he would have whipped off the British to New Delhi but he would have never signed the anti-national treaty of Sugauli

These are some of the highlights of Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s speech made in Kanchanpur January 11, 2010. He addressed a protest rally as a part of the party’s fourth round of protest program after making on the spot visit of Tanakpur Barrage. Mr. Dahal in the course of his speech also mentioned that president Dr. Ram Baran Yadav had refused to participate in the Olympics-2008 held in China after he was told not to go there by his masters. “I however, refused to honor such directives coming from outside and headed to China”, he also said.

Similarly, Mr. Mohan Baidya Kiran, Unified Maoists’ Party vice chairman said addressing a protest rally in Pashupati Nagar of Ilam that the war with India will not end until it lawfully returns all occupied Nepali lands. Mr. Baidya made this remark after making an on-the-spot observation of the India occupied territories of Nepal in Pashupati Nagar. “Our fight for independence will make our country totally free from India”, he also said. “We do not want to irritate India, however, we want to live like a sovereign citizens of a free country”, he also said.

Dr. Babu Ram Bhattarai, party’s another vice chairman who is being time and again labeled as pro-India man in the Maoists’ party also came down heavily against India. Dr. Bhattarai had arrived in Susta of Nawalparasi district to closely observe Nepali lands now under Indian occupation. He also addressed a rally. “We do not want to disturb the age-old our roti-beti relations with India, we want our lands back that’s all”, said Bhattarai. “We have always criticized expansionist attitude of the Indian ruling elites but we have no feeling of resentment against the friendly Indian people.”

Narayan Kaji Shrestha alias Prakash, yet another vice-chairman of the party visited the Laxman Pur Dam in Banke district. “India must apologize to Nepali public for constructing the Laxmanpur dam ignoring international rules and regulations”, Prakash said.

15 Responses to “Nepal: Maoist Leaders Demand India Return Occupied Land”

  1. nando said

    Can anyone explain what the particular regions in dispute are?

    What does it mean to say “We have been cheated in Gandak, Koshi and we are going to be cheated again in Mahakali”?

    Are they demanding the return of Nepali land that have been absorbed into India? Is this a demand for a change of border?

    The unequal treaties do not simply involve borders (but Indian rights in Nepal, and various curtailments of Nepali sovereignty).

    How does this relate to the controversies of the Terai?

  2. nando said

    Also, the world is awakening to the criminality of the Indian states actions in the tribal regions. Are the nepali maoists now choosing to participate in challenging the Indian state? In helping to expose it at this crucial moment?

    In other words, I’m asking:

    How does the Nepali Maoist choice to make “independence’ their key issue related to the aggressive counterrevolutionary campaigns of the Indian state within India, against Maoists within India?

  3. Arthur said

    Gandak, Koshi and Mahakali refer to disputes over water rights and damns that have been in India’s interest rather than Nepal’s. These have been major political issues in Nepal, resulting in splits in UML etc.

    There is no demand for a change in the border but an end to Indian encroachment of Nepalese territory (and Indian Border Security Forces bullying of Nepalis). Also flooding of Nepalese territory by damns built just across the border.

    Its primarily about “Big Brother” India encouraging, organizing and directing the Nepal Army and “22 party government” to oppose Maoists in Nepal (including splitting MJF so half its representatives joined the government). They are saying that civilian supremacy is being blocked by Indian interference.

    A secondary aspect is Indian support for armed groups in Terai (not necessarily organized by central Indian government but by Bihari pro-landlord politicans connected to Madheshi landlords). Madheshis are caste hindus with no connection to Indian tribals.

    Not about internal affairs of India.

    Main point is that they are making it very clear that India should butt out and that Nepalese parties relying on Indian support will be discredited as anti-national – and undermining the continuous attempts by “mandale” (courtier/royalist) “nationalists” to present the peace agreement with Maoists as something imposed on them by India (which did previously encourage the peace agreement) and to present the Maoists, especially Bhatterai, as “Indian agents” (using the fact that Maoist leaders often operated from India during the People’s War).

    Resentment of “Big Brother” India runs very deep in Nepal and most opposition parties emphasize it (while sucking up to India when in government).

  4. nando said

    clearly India has been intriguing for coups and political resistance to the Maoist revolution. Targeting and exposing India weakens a number of reactionary forces inside Nepal — and mobilizes the people’s just opposition to long-standing and odious domination.

    Koshi high dam was built on terms benefiting India’s agriculture and development (and not Nepal).

    here is an excerpt:

    http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/forum/topics/780588:Topic:72535

    “The Koshi River, which in earlier days was known as the “sorrow of Bihar” due to flooding in the monsoon and drought in winter, became the “pride of India” (Bihar) when the Barrage was completed. It was constructed between 1959 and 1963 on the Nepal side of the Indo-Nepal border for the purpose of irrigation, flood control and hydropower generation. It has 45 spurs, 500 m apart, on the eastern embankments in Nepal. The Koshi is a 729 km long river, originating near Mt. Everest from the world’s highest glaciers — on the Tibetan plateau and in Nepal. The Koshi enters Bihar (the Northern most State of India) and finally ends at the confluence of Gangas, travelling from Nepal. It may be the only river in the world to horizontally change its course as much as 120 km in the last 250 years. The Koshi Barrage has a capacity of 950,000 cusecs in a peak flood. The Twelve to 16 km wide embankment has, unfortunately, also served as a silt trap, raising the bed of the river higher than the surrounding alluvial plane.
    Nepal is the second richest country of water resources, after Brazil. The Freshwater flowing down through the Himalayan range across the Chinese border as attracted a few powerful interests. Although, China has upper co-riparian rights, it has not created any major trouble for Nepal. Relevant excerpts from the Indo-Nepal Koshi agreement 1954 on authority, duties and responsibilities are:
    • The Government of India (GoI) shall be authorized to conduct necessary investigation for storage or detention for dams on the Koshi or its tributaries – soil conservation, check dams, forestation, etc. for prevention of future problems (Art. 2.2).
    • Nepal shall provide necessary lands to execute the said project (Art. 3.1). And compensation of land to be provided by India to Nepal (Art. 3.2). India shall execute all necessary repair work and maintenance, and if incident occurs, compensation for every damage case shall be provided to Nepal (Art. 3.3). Required construction materials shall be brought from Chatara, Dharan Bazar, etc. (Art. 3.4).
    • India shall regulate all the generated power supplied by the Koshi River (Art. 4.1). Nepal shall utilize up to 50 percent of the hydro-electric power generated at the Barrage, paying tariff rates to India (Art. 4.2).
    • India shall be the owner of all lands acquired from Nepal. The sovereignty rights and territorial jurisdiction of the Government in respect of such lands shall continue unimpaired by such transfer (Art.5).
    • Nepal shall receive royalties in respect to power generation (art. 6.1). The prices of stone, gravel, etc. shall be paid to Nepal (Art. 6.2). Compensation is to be given to Nepal against the use of timber (Art. 6.4).
    • Nepal shall charge no customs duty for any kind of construction and maintenance materials (Art. 7). Compensation shall be provided in cash for lands, forests, village houses, etc. in Nepal (Art. 8.1). The barrage shall be open to public traffic but India shall have the right to close it (Art. 8.4).
    • India shall give preference to Nepali labor (Art. 12). India shall establish schools, hospitals, provision of water-supply and electricity, drainage, tramway lines and other civic amenities in the project territory of Nepal (Art. 13). Nepal shall be responsible for ensuring security in the project areas (Art. 14). Nepal agrees to establish special courts to settle the disputes raised within the Project area (Art. 15). India shall be responsible for investigations and necessity of storage or detention dams and other soil conservation measures on the Koshi and its tributaries (Art. 16). Two persons – one to be from Nepal and the other by India – are to be appointed for arbitration (Art. 17).
    In 1978, when the Koshi tried to breach eastern embankment which had made endanger even to Biratnagar (eastern Nepal), second urban city after Kathmandu, Nepal Government repaired the dam borrowing 7 billion Nepalese currency loan from World Bank without seeking any support from India.
    Nepal signed a second similar treaty with India, the Gandak Treaty, in 1959. When the Tanakpur Treaty was signed by Girija Prasad Koirala in 1991, he tried to hide the facts by saying that it was an agreement. But the Supreme Court gave a verdict canceling it, as it was indeed a treaty. Later, the Mahakali Integrated Development River Treaty was signed by the then Prime Minister of Nepal, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and his counterpart in India, PV Narsimha Rao, on February 12, 1996. The CPN (Maoist) initiated the People’s War the following day. Cancellation of the Mahakali treaty was one of the major demands out of the 40 submitted to the government before initiation. Due in part to the Mahakali treaty, the CPN(UML), along with the Nepali Congress, paid a heavy price in the recent Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, becoming third and second party in the CA respectively. Madhav Kumar Nepal lost in both his constituencies. Nepal’s leadership claimed that the Mahakali Treaty remained as a benchmark in Nepal-India relations, but the treaty could not be implemented even after 12-year. Thus, India has been gaining lower riparian rights (consumptive rights) of water use, minimizing in many cases the upper riparian rights of Nepal.
    Witness of the Koshi treaty
    The Koshi Control Board meeting, held in Patana on March 2, 1956, orally agreed to rehabilitate approximately 45,000 displaced Nepali people. It agreed to:
    • find land for affected families; the Government of India shall provide the financial assistance to build their houses as compensation;
    • manage schools, roads, and drinking water;
    • provide “one employment opportunity to each family.”
    The rehabilitation was started in 1958, allocating 21.2 million NRs to support victims’ families. However, by the end of 1960, only 70 villages were rehabilitated. From1972 to 1973, only 32,540 (72%) families received installment I to build their new houses. Again, 10,580 families received installment II as compensation. However, no families received the remaining installment III. Due to the Indian Government’s negligence, even the rehabilitated families suffered from floods due to improper drainage in summer, despite what was assured in the treaty.
    In 1962, a committee was formed to find out ways of all-round development, particularly for agriculture, health, road, industry, etc. for the displaced families, but their efforts were in vain. A similar committee headed by the Koshi Development and the Chief Administrator of the River Basin Project came into existence five years later. But again, the families were disappointed as it only partially succeeded. In the course of addressing the socio-economic problems of the displaced families, a committee was formed under the leadership of Chandrakishor Pathak in 1981. The committee submitted its report the following year, but the report didn’t become enforced until 1987. That finally formed the Koshi Pidit Vikas Samiti. Yet again it proved useless in delivering political economy to the affected. The huge (321bighas) land that Nepal had provided to India in September 1959 for field research has not been returned, although the contract period ended 30-year back, in 1978.
    India, water rights and her neighbors
    The waters of Jhelum and Chenab, originating in Jammu and Kashmir, helped instigate the India-Pakistan war. Lower riparian right holder, Bangladesh, shares 54 rivers and has serious differences with New Delhi that delay agreement on eight. Dhaka continues to complain to New Delhi about water sharing of the Gangas. India’s linking project from the Gangas to Brahmaputra has been fueling tension with Bangladesh for a long time. Unlike Bangladesh and Pakistan, Nepal is a small, landlocked country that has not had any serious bargaining leverage due to the asymmetrical treaty of Sharada Dam (1927), the Koshi Agreement (1954), the Gandak Agreement (1959), the Tanakpur Agreement (1991) and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). A few important statements or reports from India on the Koshi have been given below (http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2007/07/1034):
    “…The last point, no discharge control — no flood control. Unless discharge is controlled, scientists all over the world are convinced that floods cannot be controlled…Embankments do not control discharge, they can, at best…

  5. nando said

    It is now clearer to me, that when they refer to “Gandak, Koshi and we are going to be cheated again in Mahakali” they are talking about the names of the major rivers running down from the high mountains into the Ganges plain (crossing over at some point from Nepal to India).

    The unequal treaties with India regulate and control all kinds of details in how those rivers are “tamed” (dammed, used for irrigation, how the dams are built and maintained etc.)

    another excerpt:

    http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-124261679/water-source-international-conflicts.html

    “Nepal is always in conflict with India in the common and equal utilization of water resources, mainly from the Koshi, Gandak, Karnali and Mahakai rivers.

    “The people of Nepal have a serious grievance towards India; they feel betrayed by India in the conduct of Koshi (1954), Gandak (1959) and Mahakali (1996) river agreements.

    “They consider themselves as betrayed and even cheated by India in terms of water rights and their common and equal usage of the waters. In some cases, Nepal has floods during monsoon and drought during the dry season. Bangladesh’s experiences are similar.

    “These water conflicts have been the backbone of their foreign policy with India. The past experiences are full of conflicts without solutions to the proper utilization of shared water resources.

    “On the part of India, even the riparian rights and benefits issues of Nepal and Bangladesh are grossly ignored. India denies the riparian rights and benefits of Nepal, but claims them from Bangladesh.”

    Definition of Riparian water rights (or simply riparian rights):

    A system of allocating water among those who possess land about its source. It has its origins in English common law. Riparian rights exist in many countries with a common law heritage, such as Canada, Australia, and states in the eastern United States.

    In other words, India denies the sovereignty of Nepal in regard to water rights of its own rivers.

  6. Ka Frank said

    Responding to Nando’s question about the decision of the UCPN (Maoist) to make its primary campaign one of defending national independence (primarily against India), I don’t think it has anything to do with opposition to Operation Green Hunt aimed at India’s Maoists.

    While the demand to correct the border and renegotiate unequal treaties with India is just, this new “tactical line” represents a shift away from confrontation with the Congress-UML government, and with the Nepalese Army as well. This shift comes on the heels of an unsuccessful campaign to reinstitute a Maoist-led government (which required UML participation the last time around), and the announcement of 13 autonomous states that has been largely symbolic. The Maoist threat to set up parallel governments has not been carried out. The recent spate of Maoist-led land seizures has also ended or been called off. The Maoists have agreed to integrate the PLA into the Army by May, though the details are still in dispute. Without a 2/3 majority in the Constituent Assembly, a new constitution would not change anything in the current relations of military and political power. Finally, Prachanda’s unusual statement about preparing to seize state power was immediately contradicted by Bhattarai.

    Clearly the UCPN (Maoist) leadership is not following through on the decision of its 2009 Central Committee meeting to fight for a People’s Republic–which requires overthrowing the present bourgeois government and the Nepalese Army standing behind it.

  7. Arthur said

    The aim is not to “confront” anybody but to isolate and divide their opponents while building mass organization – watch and learn.

  8. Arthur said

    BTW there’s a US contact address in the .pdf press kit for the oscar nominated film “Women Rebels”. It might be useful to help organize screenings. I rather like the Hsila Yami quote “Nepal is like a thread – but that thread is like a fuse – and when lit the whole world will detonate”.

    http://www.womenrebels.org/home.html

  9. nando said

    I am still trying to understand what the meaning of the reorientation is. What is clear to me is that the attempts at military coup were tied to India (and secondarily the U.S. etc.) — and that this is both ominous and infuriating broadly.

    Targetting India (which has always been the main dominating power and a powerful hidden player in all Nepali politics) is inevitable and necessary.

    Historically, the Congress party has been the direct agent of India, while the monarchy and army have portrayed themselves as guaranteurs of national independence (“against” India, while in fact serving India’s needs in many ways.)

    The fact that the army high command has revealed itself as collaborating with India in coup preparations is revealing — and delegitimizing. And may be part of the tactical picture.

    Ka Frank writes:

    “I don’t think it has anything to do with opposition to Operation Green Hunt aimed at India’s Maoists.”

    I’m curious why others have dismissed this so lightly. I suspect that the politics in south Asia will increasingly include the counterinsurgency (and atrocities) of the Indian government — and that this can be exploited well on India’s periphery by radical forces.

    Obviously the main reasons for the UCPN(M) tactics are internal — applying their ongoiong Maoist method of “defeat your enemies one by one” — which has worked so well for them over the last decade-plus.

    “…this new “tactical line” represents a shift away from confrontation with the Congress-UML government, and with the Nepalese Army as well.”

    I would be curious how you see this, and what you base this on.

    “This shift comes on the heels of an unsuccessful campaign to reinstitute a Maoist-led government (which required UML participation the last time around)…”

    It is unsuccessful if you assume they thought it would happen. It was unlikely — and was (from what I can tell) an agitational demand for exposure purposes.

    There is a recurring issue in analysis: that the agitational demands of the Maoists are sometmes read literally — as if you can se what they are trying to accomplish by reading what they are “demanding.” I have always found this very naive.

    A campaign is successful if the initiators accomplish whatever their real goals were — it may have very little connection to the demands on their banners.

    “….the announcement of 13 autonomous states that has been largely symbolic.”

    Wasn’t it obvious that this was largely symbolic? As part of building forces for a NON-symbolic future change?

    And how do you know how much NON-symbolic impact that announcement has had? How do we evaluate from here its impact on national minoirty politics? Can we evaluate if new underground mnority dual power committees were formed?

    And without such data, how can we pretend to know whether this has been unsuccessful, or ONLY symbolic?

    “The Maoist threat to set up parallel governments has not been carried out.”

    I would be curious to know what data this is based on. I suspect they are forming underground committees, and trying to bring in united front forces to participate. How do you know none of tis has been carried out?

    “The recent spate of Maoist-led land seizures has also ended or been called off.”

    Perhaps I missed the analysis that showed the land seizures have stopped. Please share it with me. Or explain what this claim is based on.

    “The Maoists have agreed to integrate the PLA into the Army by May, though the details are still in dispute.”

    This has always been true. I.e. there is a superficial “agreement” to fuse the two armies… and the details are always in dispute (because “the devil is in the details.” And as is known, the issue in those details is precisely who is integrated into who. (Do Maoist officers enter top command level positions? Do top generals get removed by future Maoist minsters?)

    I have always viewed the integration” talk as largely an agitational way of exposing the army, with no one seriously thinkng it would happen (or that the army would agree to civilian control and “democratization” or the integration of Maoist generals without a fight.)

    There may be some middle forces (including perhaps a wing of the Maoists) who have aspirations of an ANC-type integration (as happened in post-apartheid South Africa). But i think that is a minority view precisely because it is so unlikely.

    The only time such things become “practical” is if the Maoists fail at their larger project — finding a credible approach to the seizure of overall power (which has, understandably, proven very difficult in fact.)

    “Without a 2/3 majority in the Constituent Assembly, a new constitution would not change anything in the current relations of military and political power.”

    This assumes that there will be a new constitution. In fact, there has been mainly a deadlock — between COMPETING concepts.

    Is there evidence that some compromise mushy constitution is emerging from this? And if so, why speak about a non-existant “new constitution” that you announce will be unsatisfactory?

    “Finally, Prachanda’s unusual statement about preparing to seize state power was immediately contradicted by Bhattarai.”

    From which you assume what?

    “Clearly the UCPN (Maoist) leadership is not following through on the decision of its 2009 Central Committee meeting to fight for a People’s Republic–which requires overthrowing the present bourgeois government and the Nepalese Army standing behind it.”

    You have made a lawyerly interpretation of ten different aspects of the situation — to arrive at the conclusion you have held since 2006.

    But, if you look at each sentence of the argument they are dubious. In other words, it looks to me that you interpret every fact or event in a highly tendentious way — to arrive (yet again) at the conclusion that you started with.

    And then, I imagine, as some new advance or crisis happens, you will feel “there is a left motion that challenges the long-standing revisionist dominations…”

    I am sincere when I wrote above that there may be facts I missed (or misunderstood). And I would truly like to hear elaborated what many of the verdicts above are BASED on (factually).

    But on first pass, it feels like interpreting the sparce available info to confirm a pre-existing assumption. That always feels dangerous and premature — because it seems to ignore that something very very different may well be in motion.

  10. Arthur said

    Some quick notes (from closely monitoring english language sources, not direct knowledge).

    1. The idea that targeting India is related directly to solidarity with Indian Maoists can be dismissed lightly because there is absolutely no evidence of it. (Ka Frank isn’t ALWAYS wrong). There have of course been (earlier) statements (eg from Hsila Yami and CP Gajurel as well as Prachanda) that they still sympathize with the Indian Maoists struggle. But that just isn’t an aspect of the current campaign AT ALL. This may seem puzzling from the viewpoint of international solidarity activists but a mass based revolutionary party has an actual revolution of its own to wage, and knows that will assist others far more than the solidarity statements it may also routinely issue.

    For some fairly perceptive analysis of the border encroachment aspect of the campaign in an anti-Maoist weekly see:

    http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/2010/01/15/PlainSpeaking/16703

    2. The announcement of autonomous republics has had an enormous impact. Its more than symbolic.

    3. An implied threat of proceeding to replace the existing state at all levels has been made. The preferred option is still for that to happen peacefully and legally by carrying out the peace agreement for the Constitutional Assembly to restructure the state. The likelihood of that preferred option has been increased by making it clear that its going to be done, one way or the other.

    4. Its not a matter of “underground commmittees”. They are an open presence throughout Nepal, stronger than the state in most rural areas.

    5. The Army does not need “exposing” in Nepal. It is widely hated and feared. The agreeent for integration (as part of democratization) is only superficial on the anti-Maoist side. It is absolutely insisted on from the Maoist side and their opponents are so worried it will actually happen that they panicked when Prachanda merely appointed Katwal’s own deputy to replace him.

    6. Consequently no constitution can be written that is not based on a complete transformation in the current relations of military and political power. This is nominally provided for in the interim constitution but as always remains the central question of state power.

    7. There is some (inconclusive) evidence that a compromise (“mushy”) constitution will emerge as there are signs of the UML majority and some of the Congress backing off from the brink. eg UML has shifted considerably towards the Maoist position on federalism and Oli speaks more and more as a (diehard) minority in the UML, while the PM looks quite isolated. But no constitution will emerge without civilian supremacy and army integration.

    8. Land seizures have been greatly exaggerated by the anti-Maoist parties. Its mainly been in response to specific outrageous situations rather than overall movement for implementing land reform. As far as I can make out only Matrika Yadav’s party claims land reform should be attempted before actual consolidation of state power in the Terai.

    9. As well as there being internal differences, Maoist party pronouncements are often ambiguous, conflicting and contradictory. As mentioned in a letter to RIM a while back, this is not unintentional. In particular the merged formula about People’s Democratic National Federal Republic or whatever appears to be intended to be as clear as mush, both internally and externally. I doubt that so many words could translate less mushily in Nepalese languages.

    10. Anti-Maoist media are currently wetting themselves over differences between Bhatterai and Prachanda. (I suspect there are rather more significant differences between Kiran and both). Apart from Matrika Yadav, the party seems to be solidly united despite differences – in stark contrast to the others.

    Preparing to capture state power and preparing to form a national government, draft a “mushy” constitution and win the subsequent elections are aspects of the same contradictory whole.

    Reminder: better insight and some actual solidarity might be generated using the film linked above. That fuse could be lit soon. It would be a shame not to be part of the detonation.

  11. Ka Frank said

    I’d like to respond to Nando’s points and questions. My statements are in quotes, Nando’s follow them.

    (1) “…this new “tactical line” represents a shift away from confrontation with the Congress-UML government, and with the Nepalese Army as well.” I would be curious how you see this, and what you base this on.

    The UCPN (Maoist) is presently staging its demonstrations at the border and is targeting India. At most this indirectly targets the Congress-UML government and the Nepal Army.

    (2) “This shift comes on the heels of an unsuccessful campaign to reinstitute a Maoist-led government (which required UML participation the last time around)…” It is unsuccessful if you assume they thought it would happen. It was unlikely — and was (from what I can tell) an agitational demand for exposure purposes.

    If you look at Prachanda’s statements going back to the summer of 2009 predicting the fall of the government, it is clear that this campaign was not waged for “exposure purposes,” but was a serious effort that came up short, and had to be replaced with a new campaign. So what is the basis for your assumption that it was all about exposure?

    (3) “The Maoist threat to set up parallel governments has not been carried out.” I would be curious to know what data this is based on. I suspect they are forming underground committees, and trying to bring in united front forces to participate. How do you know none of this has been carried out?

    My sources are the Maoists and the reactionaries themselves. The Maoists have not announced the formation of these parallel governments, and the reactionaries have not screamed bloody murder about them. You “suspect” that they are forming underground committees without citing any evidence.

    (4) “The recent spate of Maoist-led land seizures has also ended or been called off.” Perhaps I missed the analysis that showed the land seizures have stopped. Please share it with me. Or explain what this claim is based on.

    There have been no recent reports of Maoist-led land seizures by the press or the Maoists. There would be if they were going on as they are a hot button issue for the reactionaries.

    (5) “The Maoists have agreed to integrate the PLA into the Army by May, though the details are still in dispute.” This has always been true. I.e. there is a superficial “agreement” to fuse the two armies… and the details are always in dispute (because “the devil is in the details.” And as is known, the issue in those details is precisely who is integrated into who. (Do Maoist officers enter top command level positions? Do top generals get removed by future Maoist ministers?) I have always viewed the “integration” talk as largely an agitational way of exposing the army, with no one seriously thinkng it would happen (or that the army would agree to civilian control and “democratization” or the integration of Maoist generals without a fight.)

    Taking the PLA out of its guerilla zones into UN-administered camps and integrating the PLA into the royalist Nepal Army (not the other way around) were at the core of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. This was not just an agitational way of exposing the army. I agree that the Army high command and the Maoists seem to be at loggerheads on this issue, with the army not willing to agree to unit integration, which is the only basis that Prachanda and allies would conceivably agree to. It’s best for the PLA and the revolutionary process that such integration not take place.

    (6) “Finally, Prachanda’s unusual statement about preparing to seize state power was immediately contradicted by Bhattarai.” From which you assume what?

    I don’t know what to make of Prachanda’s original statement, which was posted on this site a week or so ago. It was out of character for him, as Prachanda has continually stressed that the party’s goals are reinstitution of a Maoist-led government, civilian supremacy over the army, integration of the PLA into the NA, writing a new constiution, and generally “taking the peace process to its logical conclusion.” This is the line that Prachanda has championed within the UCPN (Maoist), as is known to forces close to the party, but which Nando does not understand or believe. Bhattarai’s response that Prachanda’s statement was incorrect–that the party is not planning to seize power–was totally in synch with his past positions.

    The points I made in Comment 6 are based on actual developments on the ground in Nepal–not deduced from an a priori conclusion that the CPA represented a step back for the CPN (Maoist) and for the people’s revolution in Nepal.

    However, it must be said that the demobilization of the PLA, the party’s entry into coalition building with the reactionary UML, and three years of struggle in the government, the Constituent Assembly and the streets have not developed into a movement that has the potential to overthrow the bourgeois state and bring a new democratic People’s Republic of Nepal into being. I agree with Nando that the Maoists are having a great deal of “trouble finding a credible approach to the seizure of overall power.” This is not simply a question of difficult objective conditions, but is a product of the hegemony of a revisionist line in the UCPN (Maoist) that has not focused the party’s efforts, both in public and secretly, on preparing the masses and the party itself for building up to a revolutionary seizure of power when conditions ripen.

  12. Rajesh said

    “However, it must be said that the demobilization of the PLA, the party’s entry into coalition building with the reactionary UML, and three years of struggle in the government, the Constituent Assembly and the streets have not developed into a movement that has the potential to overthrow the bourgeois state and bring a new democratic People’s Republic of Nepal into being. I agree with Nando that the Maoists are having a great deal of “trouble finding a credible approach to the seizure of overall power.” This is not simply a question of difficult objective conditions, but is a product of the hegemony of a revisionist line in the UCPN (Maoist) that has not focused the party’s efforts, both in public and secretly, on preparing the masses and the party itself for building up to a revolutionary seizure of power when conditions ripen.”

    The above paragraph by Ka Frank sumarizes the actual standing of UCPN (Maoist) today. The leadership has abandoned the revolutionary political line and is busy finding out some honourable way to occupy better space for them in the existing state power. The deviation started from the 12 points Delhi agreement and matured after tasting the luxury of Kathmandu power corridor. All agitation programs including this ongoing anti-India agitation simply have two objectives – 1. slow liquidation of revolutionary ideology, line and cadres, and 2. strengthening bargaining power to get the seat of shared power in Kathmandu back. At the international level, UNMIN has been functioning as a liquidator of Maoist revolutionary force in Nepal and at national level, the core leadership of the Unified CPN (Maoist) has been performing the same job. The Nepali revolution is passing through a phase of historic set back. But there are enough reasons that the process of realignment of revolutionary forces will get acceleration soon.

  13. Arthur said

    I agree that the Army high command and the Maoists seem to be at loggerheads on this issue, with the army not willing to agree to unit integration, which is the only basis that Prachanda and allies would conceivably agree to. It’s best for the PLA and the revolutionary process that such integration not take place.

    I rather doubt that the “process of realignment of revolutionary forces” towards the stand of the Nepal Army, India and the most reactionary politicians in Nepal will have much appeal. Instead of following the “comradely” advice to go underground it rather looks to me like revolutionaries in Nepal will continue to openly organize larger and larger masses of the people to take power while denunciations of this as “revisionism” and a “historic setback” will not prevent more and more people outside Nepal, even those that haven’t already seen through the absurdity of politically irrelevant sects, studying carefully how the Nepalese comrades created something that actually works.

  14. Perth chairs…

    […]Nepal: Maoist Leaders Demand India Return Occupied Land « Revolution in South Asia[…]…

  15. Priyanka said

    Nepal Should get all the land like Darjeeling, Sikkim, Himalchal, Uttarakhand, Lucknow, Kalapani, Naninital and even Bangladesh (Dinajpur and Rangapur). Indian are cheaters………..

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