Revolution in South Asia

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Nepal: Maoists Refuse to Accept Partial Army Integration

Posted by Rosa Harris on September 17, 2010

This article was published on Telegraph Nepal.

Nepal Maoist further complicate Peace Process, demand integration en masse

Telegraph Nepal

Dr. Babu Ram Bhattarai, Vice chairman Unified Maoists’ Party responded modestly when asked by journalists whether he was the candidate for the prime ministerial post, “I do not have personal ambition to become the prime minister. It would be better if Comrade Prachanda leads the country as he is also leading the party.”

Whether Dr. Bhattarai was speaking his inner mind or something different could be a matter of debate in that while Bhattarai was clarifying his “ambitions”, his party chairman was listening to the remarks of his ‘rival’ with his head down.

The Unified Maoists’ Party organized a media interaction program on Saturday, June 26, 2010 after the completion of its ten day long (June 15-25, 2010) party politburo meeting held at the party headquarters in Parisdanda, Kathmandu wherein Dr. Bhattarai made these remarks.

The party also decided to convene the extended plenum of the central committee to point-out party’s prime contradictions.

The meeting has been scheduled for the month of September 2010.

“With the abolishment of autocratic and feudal monarchy and the unfolding political events thereafter make it clear that the party’s prime contradiction has also taken a new shape…we have concluded that our external and internal contradictions have been fused together”, reads the party’s statement distributed at the press conference.

The party senior vice chairman Mr. Mohan Baidya Kiran has already made it public that with the end of Nepali monarchy, his party’s prime contradiction was with the Indian Expansionism.

The Party statement also reads: “As per the Inter-state ideology of the proletariat, we will encourage interactions with the Communist revolutionaries across the world and develop proactive relations with them and have also decided to raise voices against the repression of the people across the world, including India.

Nevertheless, an energized looking Comrade Pushpa Kamal Dahal told journalists at the press meet adding more complexity to the stalled peace process that all UNMIN qualified Militias should undergo the integration process and that too en masse.

He said that the 19,000 UNMIN verified Militias are all qualified to undergo integration.

“We will not accept the modality for integration on individual basis, instead we favor a separate security force to be formed for the Peoples’ Liberation Army”, he continued.

He made it clear to his political rivals in the UML and Nepali Congress camps that nowhere in the Broader Peace Agreement has there been mentioned pin-pointing the number of PLA combatants that would undergo the integration process.

Thus, Dahal said, it would be against the peace agreement to pressurize us to provide the number of PLA men at this juncture.

Dahal at the press meet was flanked by his party deputies, vice chairmen Dr. Bhattarai, Mohan Baidya Kiran and Narayan Kaji Prakash.

“We have come to the conclusion that the likelihood of formation of consensus government has become almost impossible”, noted Prachanda and added, “Yet we have kept both option open, consensus and majority government, both.”

“I urge you journalists not to understand more than what we have said, we have said that consensus government should be formed under our leadership and the leadership means party’s chairman”, said Dahal and left the venue.

The Highlights of Party decision follows:
· Struggle from Three Fronts: Sadak, Sadan and Sarkar (Street, Parliament and Government).
· Unified Front at the local level to provide security, control price hike and provide other basic services to the common people.

15 Responses to “Nepal: Maoists Refuse to Accept Partial Army Integration”

  1. artemi0 said

    I think this article, even if a couple months old- give’s insight into the Maoists’ orientation when it comes to army integration.

    They may accept it en masse- if it’s more or less on their terms, if they can gain decisive control or influence over the existing security appartus. Others on the comment’s here have argued that this orientation is a dangerous illusion to have.

    I’m not convinced for several reasons; Primarily the Maoists are putting forward a model of army integration that none of the other players will accept. Not the army, not the parlimentary parties, Not India. Secondarily- if by hook or crook, this model of integration were to happen, it would strenghten the Maoist hand. Realize this is a point of contention- and am sure we will have this debate once again.

    To further complicate matters at the level of appearance- Today the Maoist’s agreed on paper to bring the supervision, command, & control of the PLA under a government Special Committee. This is not the first time similar agreement’s have been made- but as they say the devil is in the details. When it come’s to Nepali politics and agreements- the way that it usually happens- is it doesn’t happen at all.

    I suspect that the Maoist’s will use this new agreement as a platform to argue for the model they will accept for army integration- which includes democratization and downsizing of the swelled numbers of the Nepal Army, and integration en masse of all PLA fighters.

  2. Ka Frank said

    Yes, this article is nearly three months old. As Artemi0 points out above, the demand for integration en masse of the 19,000 PLA ex-combatants is opposed by all of the other players–the NC, UML, the army itself, the US and India.
    When Dahal went so far as to uphold civilian control of the army by relieving the chief of staff of his command, this was enough to bring down the government. Several months back, Dahal promised not to stage a repeat performance if he was reelected to the Prime Ministership. So the demand for total integration is just hot air that Dahal blows from time to time.

    In reality, over the past year or so, intensive negotiations to determine the number of soldiers, and method of recruitment, have come up with 3000-7000 PLA soldiers going into the Nepal Army, with the remainder being sent into Border Police, National Armed Police, etc. or “rehabilitated” for civilian life. According to leaked reports, one of the main stumbling blocks has been the demand of the UCPNM for “unit integration” instead of individual integration.

    The main thing blocking the deal has been the UCPNM’s insistence on a “package deal” with the NC, UML and the army–which would form a new national unity government with Dahal as PM, agree on the main terms for a new Constitution and a deal on the integration and fragmentation of the PLA–in other words, a negotiated completion of the peace process.

    During the recent Central Committee meeting, Vice-Chairman Mohan Baidya (Kiran) has taken the position that the whole process from the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 (when he and Gajurel were in jail in India) has been erroneous. According to the Nepali papers, Kiran is calling on the party to prepare for a “people’s revolt.”

  3. artemi0 said

    I too, am excited about the new’s of Kiran’s dossier presented for discussion at the recent central committee meeting. Am assuming right now- all we have to go on are accounts in the english language bourgeouis press (nepalnews.com & myrepublica.com reports). My understanding from these very limited accounts is Kiran presented a dossier mainly arguing for a review of the party’s policy and practice since 2006- and a fresh “people’s revolt”-, and Bhattari presented a dossier argueing that the current framework of peace process is not yet exausted- & there is still room for maneuver within it.

    Would LOVE to get an english language copy of both papers. Ka Frank- you seem like a pretty informed and resourceful cat. To paraphrase a scene in the Shawshank Redemption- a man who is known “to locate certain things from time to time”. I understand that english language translations from the UCPN M (by their very nature), are limited as well. But more informed than snippets in the bourgeouis press…

    It’s correct to point out that the Maoist demand for the resignation of General Katawal-for the short period the Maoist’s lead the government- ended the Maoist led government. It should also be pointed out- that when this demand was not met, the maoists withdrew and subtracted from a toothless government. The Maoist’s ended their own government, on their own terms- exposing the regressive and reactionary nature of the existing Nepal Army as such.

    After having followed and read your (ka frank’s) comments for quite some time I feel you have argued that it was a “mistake” to suspend the peoples war and engage in the constituent assembly (or the peace process), and you feel it was also a compromising move for the Maoist’s to withdraw from the government (this was an indication of their weakness). Perhaps I misunderstood.

    I don’t want to nitpick- but will (am open to clarifacation). You say the series of events regarding the relieving of the chief of staff General Katawal of his command brought down the government. A detail that wasn’t included in this description is that it wasn’t just General Katawal to be relieved. The series of events was the Maoist’s sought to bring forced retirement of 8 brigadier genererals (a good chunk of the high command of the Nepal Army)- General Katawal stepped in and tried to block this move- The Maoist’s in turn demanded General Katawals resignation as well. In turn cerimonial president- backed katawal, – prodded and backed by India. The demand for civilllian supremecy (by the elected then Maoist led gov’t)- was raised in this context.

    Who control’s the army? The elected government? The ceremonial president? India? the US? The loyal royal generals of the old state?

    One way of answering these questions is to say that the series of event’s brought the Maoist led gov’t down. Another narritive- is the Maoists recognized the toothless position they were in heading a multiparty government- but not controlling the state, thus withdrew and subtracted saving face and preparing for another revolt-exposing which class interests lie where.

    Not throwing a rock and hiding my hand here- arguing the latter is what actually happened. From the limited accounts I have seen-I think Kiran’s dossier is argueing for it as well. He’s not actually saying the whole decision and process has been a total mistake- but saying it needs to be reviewed, and a new course should be taken. IMO a very logical proposition to put forward in the situation of protracted (neverending) stalemate.

    I don’t think it’s fair, or materialist, or dynamic- to paraphrase a loose “promise” by Prachanda (about not restaging past events)- and thus deduce he is full of shit, blows, or is full of hot air- when it comes to specifics of army integration.

    Promises and agreements in politics in general, Nepali politics in particular- are real slippery. That’s just the way it is. In Nepali politics- literally NO ONE keeps their promises. During the recent general strike- the Maoist’s and UML reached a 11th hour agreement in which PM Nepal would resign. Through a lot of contortion and parlimentary legalism- MK Nepal is no longer the Prime Minister- he’s the caretaker Prime Minister. Big Deal, Big Fucking whoop.. Things are the same as they were yesterday- total and perfect- stalemate.

    Yes, absolutely- our Nepali comrades are playing this game. They are engaging in the politcs of their nation and trying through every little twist and turn- to change the terms. There is a ton of struggle and debate in their party about the road forward. There is a right, a left, and a center- united around revolution, strategy tactics pace and timing TBD.

    From all of this- a real and heavy question that has been weighing on my mind- is how to overcome the stalemate?

  4. Ben said

    This is outdated news; please refer to a Republica article, dated September 17, on army integration in Nepal, which was posted couple of days ago on the website of Frontlines of Revolutionary Struggles. It reported the latest UCPNM’s position on the crucial issue of who shall control the gun in the country; certain key party leaders have reportedly agreed to relinquish party command and control of the PLA to a Special Committee monitered.

  5. Rajesh said

    Below is the article posted in http://www.myrepublica.com. The 12 member committe that will command the PLA is “White” rather than “Red”.

    PLA now under Special Committee
    KIRAN CHAPAGAIN

    KATHMANDU, Sept 17: In a significant development, the UCPN (Maoist) has agreed in principle to disassociate the PLA from the party and place it under the Special Committee formed for supervision, integration and rehabilitation of the former combatants.

    “The combatants have come under the command and control of the Special Committee from today,” Maoist representative on the Committee Barsha Man Pun told journalists after a meeting on Thursday evening. “It is an important step toward integration and rehabilitation of (the Maoist) army.”

    Pun, who is also the in-charge of his party´s combatants integration bureau, informed that the combatants will formally come under the command and control of the Special Committee once a proposed secretariat gets final shape. He said that a special function will be organized soon to announce the PLA´s formal disassociation from the party.

    Four more members will be added to the technical committee formed under the Special Committee and it will function as the secretariat to oversee the combatants, according to Chief Secretary Madhav Prasad Ghimire, who is also spokesperson of the Committee.

    One member each from the Nepal Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and the People´s Liberation Army will be added to the technical commitee. One of the 12 members will be appointed as the coordinator.

    This is a significant development in the peace process which has remained practically stalled for so long. The government and the Maoists had agreed on Monday to conclude the peace process ´basically´ by January 14, 2011 and had sent a letter to the UN Security Council informing it about this.

    Once the secretariat becomes functional, it will cut the link of the 19,602 combatants with the Maoist party through its command, control and direction.

    A meeting of the Special Committee headed by Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on Thursday evening finalized two key documents relating to directives for command and control of the combatants and a code of conduct for the ex-Maoist army personnel.

    The code of conduct requires the combatants to severe all their ties with the party. They will be prohibited from carrying out political activities, using pictures of communist leaders in their barracks, singing of communist songs and painting communist slogans, among other things, according to Minister for Peace and Reconstruction Rakam Chemjong, who is an invitee member on the committee. They will also have to stop greeting their leaders and fellow combatants in the way communist cadres do.

    The code of conduct also bars Maoist leaders from making political speeches inside the cantonments where the combatants have been living under UN-monitoring.

    Published on 2010-09-17 02:00:00

  6. Ben said

    It’s clear now that certain key UCPNM leaders have agreed to end their party’s absolute command and control over the PLA; this goes against basic Maoist principles of not just “the party must have absolute command and control over the gun” but also “political power from the barrel of the gun” and “without a people’s army, the people have nothing…”.

    Where steel-coated bullets have failed to disarm the people’s war in Nepal, sugar-coated bullets seems to be working very well in disarming certain key UCPNM leaders of their professed adherence to Maoism and the Maoist strategy of protracted people’s war. Jimmy Carter’s strenous effort to ensure the then CPNM’s share of votes were fairly included in the 2008 election must have worked its magic to win over some key CPNM leaders to disband the PLA and abandon the people’s war to join bourgeois parliamentary politicking as usual.

  7. artemi0 said

    I for one- don’t think anything is clear now, or that this new “gentlemens agreement” regarding management and integration of the PLA by a yet non-existent special committee really changes things. And there they are-inside of a perfect stalemate.

    There is really only 1 thing to say about agreement’s in Nepali politics- the written ones & the informal ones, NO ONE ever keeps their word and follows through. All the parties (including the Maoist’s) shake one anothers hand, smile for the camera’s, & signs paper agreements. In the meantime- they are all cultivating plans to tear one another down. To paraphrase Mao- “They have honey on their lips and murder in their heart.”

    This has been going on for quite some time, and I as much as anyone else have definately felt the frustration and impatience of the protracted moment. However, I don’t think it is correct to make sweeping judgements of the Maoist’s based on short snippets in the bourgeois press. Look- we have been through this before on this site. And it happens every single time a article comes out in ruling class news that hint’s of negative consequence for the Maoist’s in Nepal.

    When it comes to agreements in Nepal- let’s look at a few;

    *In 2006 the Maoist’s underwent a transition from an outlaw party- to a legal party. They signed a perioid foundational document (the CPA) in which they agreed on paper to return all seized lands, and to merge their army the PLA with the royal army (now the Nepal Army). Neither of these things have happened! There have been multiple commissions and committees, multiple revised agreements on paper and informal- Hell, the goddamn UN is involved. Yet still and to this day- nothing has happened.

    *The Maoist’s did “stand down” militarily. So did the Nepal Army. Both for the most part are staying in barracks, bases, and cantonements and not engaging in any build up of forces for positional warfare. However- both forces have broken the agreement. NA and PLA have gone on recruitment drives, NA and PLA have left the barracks (not as units but individuals-on paper), both are politicized armies and remain such
    -the exception being loyalty to the cause of the NA is concentrated in the command and upper ranks- the PLA is thouroughly committed to the Maoist cause from top to bottom. Interesting to note- the UNMIN has been far more critical of the NA’s flagrant violations of the CPA than the Maoist’s (alleged) violations.

    *In exchange for the Maoist’s militarily drawing down, and engaging in mainstream politics- the other parties agreed to let them compete in free and fair elections, and agreed to accept the results. The Maoist’s won!- the other parties never really accepted it. The other parties are much more experienced at real politics- and in Nepal that means deciept and manipulation. The other parties have gone back on their end of the CPA, have used back door deals, parlimentary procedure, and extralegal measures to block the rise of the Maobadi- truth be told- they suceeded in bringing the revolution to a standstill. huh. It is in this sense that I think Ben’s warning of “sugar coated bullets” needs to be taken to heart. Sugar coated bullets are just that- soft hits that taste good. The Maobadi got legal status, won a democratic election-more importantly & long term strategically they brought into being a urban capital base of support which was virtually non existent several years ago. They were denied the fruit’s of such a victory, and recently during the May 1 general strike, it’s my feeling that they did not fully take advantage of this big win. I too am excited about the Kiran/Guarev left wing of the UCPN M that Ka Frank alludes to above.

    *The Maoist’s in Nepal (I think)- are fully aware of their position, maybe even some key leaders view it as the entanglement in the spiders web they have gotten themselves into. They did mobilize their base- urban and rural, during the recent general strike, to be clear they flexed some muscle. And know what? on paper as far as immediate demands- they got what they wanted. PM MK Nepal agreed to step down and resign. And know what? He didn’t. Through a lot of legalese parlimentary contortion, and 7 or 8 failed stalemated attempts at prime ministerial run off- MK Nepal is still the caretaker Prime Minister. So- In Nepali politics NO ONE keeps their word, ever. Let us not be too harsh on the Maobadi for playing this game (even if it appears as a ridiculous charade).

    The myrepublica.com article posted above-is not the only bourgeouis press account that has been published- there have seen several. I feel that at the level of language they all share 1 thing in common- it all very fucking cynical;

    “has agreed in principle to disassociate the PLA from the party”

    “once a proposed secretariat gets final shape. He said that a special function will be organized soon to announce the PLA´s formal disassociation from the party.”

    “Once the secretariat becomes functional…”

    Look comrades- this hasn’t happened yet. & if & when it does I will share your vocal cynism and post right here on this blog. There is at least some precedent here when it comes to agreements in general, and in particular agreements regarding the PLA- agreements in Nepal right up until now are always non binding and non functional, they are always "in principle",and they are slated to start tommorrow and hardly ever today.

    As far as details go- this special committee isn't even in existence yet. The newest and current "gentlemans agreement" the Maoist's have made (IMHO)- is a lot of hogwash. They have agreed 'in principle" to bring the command of the PLA under a nonexistent Special Committee of the government. They have proposed a Commander of the PLA, Nandor Kishor Pun, who head's the current technical committee, under the Army Integration Special Committee that will function as a secteriet in the new special committee. I mean- what the fuck? Details are important- so let's review them, but let's understand politics and the game that it is as such. And let's be clear again the current technical committee (really, whatever that is) contains PLA Deputy Commandar Prakash Kanal, & YCL in charge Kul Bhadur- the Maoists are not proposing getting rid of this committee, but expanding it under Maosit leadership.

    All very confusing- I know- and nothing is really clear now.

  8. Ben said

    It’s standard operational procedure/sop for bourgeois political leaders to confuse the hell out of the masses but for Maoist party leaders to do so amounts to joining bourgeois politicking as usual to disarm the masses from within. Had Mao and his party supporters done the same during not just the Chungqing peace talks in 1945 but other peace talks in 1949, the new democratic People’s Republic of China wouldn’t have seen the light of day on 1st October 1949; we can forget about seeing the GPCR in 1966.

    Paraphrasing Mao on bourgeois sop: “… they (the bourgeoisie and reactionaries) fight their way, we fight ours …”; confusing the hell out of the masses is not the communist way least of all Marxist or Leninist or Maoist.

  9. artemi0 said

    I don’t think the masses in Nepal are confused as hell. They are the agent’s of their revolution and social change. They have congealed into a massive people’s movement (urban & rural), that has an in tact army, a political wing, and yes- a communist vangaurd.

    They want revolution, They hate the old society- & for better or worse have hitched their aspirations for change to the Maoist’s- who have proven themselves as capable leadership. I have personally been in crowds numbering in hundreds of thousands that the Maoist’s called into action, and when Prachanda took the stage everyone went dead silent and you could hear a pin drop. Literallly.

    There is a certain amount of faith to the process that the masses have, to see it through the end. There is a loyalty or if I understand the concept of Badiou-fidelity. There is also a sense of trust the masses have for the capable Maoist leadership. I understand that this can go both ways; for example if the Maoist’s were to pursue a fundamentally wrong path (pretty sure here) the masses would follow. Also am pretty sure- the masses would follow a Maoist lead to sacrifice, death, and victory. Can we really say the masses of Nepal are “disarmed”?

    In all fairness I must admit to being “confused as hell” at points of the revolutionary process in Nepal. And impatient, and frustrated… That’s entirely subjective though. Objectively, living revolutions are in fact confusing as all hell. There are decisions, twist’s and turns, disagreement in the leadership and ranks, & discipline- all happening in moments that matter. Was the Chungking peace agreement of 45 any different? Was the founding of the PRC in 49 formulmatic and linear? Was the great proletarian cultural revolution a simple matter?

    Ben, there are lessons to be learned from the sketches of date’s and events you have listed above.Revolution is not reduciable to formula,dates & time though. I understand it as a dynamic living, complex process without any garauntee or predeterminied result

  10. Ka Frank said

    On Artemi0’s claim that the Maoists have an “intact army”: The PLA has been cut off from its roots among the masses in the countryside for the past 4 years. The only guns the Maoists have are for guard duty; they train with wooden rifles. According to many reports, the mood in the cantonments among the rank and file is one of confusion about the intentions of Prachanda and the UCPN-M leaders allied with him and Bhattarai.

    In spite of Prachanda’s occasional “left” rhetoric regarding the 19.000 PLA’s integration into the 96,000+ Nepal Army, total integration into the army is not on the table. Fragmentation is–how to split up the PLA between the Nepal Army, the National Armed Police, local police, Border Guards and “rehabilitation” into civilian life for the remaining ex-combatants.

    The main blockage to this has been the UCPN-M demand to integrate PLA units as a whole, rather than vet them as individual soldiers, and Prachanda’s aim to negotiate a “package” deal involving leadership of a new government, writing the constitution, and the disposition of the PLA–as laid out explicitly in the CC statement of the UCPN-M in early 2010.

  11. Ka Frank said

    I should add that the arms of the PLA are being held in the cantonments under a dual-lock system by the UN Mission to Nepal and the PLA. This is a tripwire that would alert UNMIN–and the Nepal Army–of any attempt of the PLA to take its weapons out of storage. This is a difficult situation for the PLA, though not impossible to address with a revolutionary line in command of the party and the PLA.

  12. artemi0 said

    Ka Frank- let’s talk, perhaps there is some confusion here. When I said the PLA is intact, I meant just that- it still exists. There is no doubt or debate on my end that the PLA has undergone some heavy changes, and even restructuring in the past 4 years.

    Many PLA leaders and commanders during the open civil war, are now leaders in the political apparatus, & street level militants in the YCL. A notiable figure is Janardhan Sharma (Prabhakar)- a deputy supreme commandar now member of the parliment. Another few major figures worth mention are Ganesh Man Pun- former 9th brigade commissar, now chairman of the YCL & Uma Bhujel famous for her leadership in a sucessful Maoist jailbreak as a section commander in the PLA, now vice chair of the YCL. There are many others, and the abovementioned is not an entire list ( I don’t have one and don’t want to create one).

    My point in summary is- The Maoist’s in Nepal have converted a countryside peoples war force into a militant urban paramilitary street fighting force appropriate for the time and (prepared, are preparing) for insurection.

    Don’t take my word for it- read this reactionary internet report:

    http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/YCL.html

    It’s from the lions mouth, read it with a grain of salt- & let’s be clear on maneuver and intentions regarding the Maoist’s.

    One of the coolest moments of my life was during the May 1st general strike. Prabhakar and entourage, decorated in sash walked through a cheering sea of people saluting and shaking hands. The people recognised him as a hero. It was a moment of total revolutionary euphoria…

    The PLA at large and as a military force does in fact remain in the cantonements though… waiting. Ka Frank is correct to point this out. 4 years in the godamn camps has bred some impatience, some frustration amongst the rank and file. There is also some confusion, in the Party, in the PLA, in the Peoples’s Movement about the road forward. There is not unanamity regarding the pace and timing of the revolution. Our little debates here are a reflection of that- of a much bigger moment in progress. I do want to say though “over there”- it’s not a question of “if?” but one of “when?”. Our arguments here seem to be confined and narrowed to the former- which isn’t really a question for the active players on the field.

    Ka Frank- I have read all your post’s and comments. I do not doubt your steadfast conviction. However, it’s my opinion that lately you are really cynical. I mean-even when there is progress and good news- you always turn it into a real downer. This is not a personal attack, and if appropriate (in advance) give the moderators of this site permission to snip this paragraph.

    I am not questioning your investigation into the above matters. You seem like a very informed and resourecful fellow. In comment 2, you refer to a Kiran/Gujarel left wing dossier presented at the recent CC meeting. From what I have read it’s presented in contention with a Bhatarai dossier. Are either or both of these documents available in english? Just curious, and just asking.

    There is real and major line struggle in the UCPN M right now-in the rank and file, in the leadership. This is not a secret- it is more or less in the open. The past several issues of Red Star give voice to this (in the Maoist’s english language publications). There are no garuntees, it’s not predetermined which line will win the day. It is my feeling that such line struggle is inevetable at a moment when there’s a world to win, and a hell of a lot to lose.

  13. artemi0 said

    I don’t want to bat away- at each and every single point Ka Frank makes. It is bad form. I have tried my best to frame things politically, in an overarching schema of where the Maoist revolution in Nepal is at.

    But for the sake of a larger argument- I want to address some inaccurasies & half truths in the posts above.

    There is an explicit claim that the PLA has been cut off from it’s roots in the coutryside over the past 4 yrs. Really? Say’s who? I was in Kathmandu when several hundred thousand maoist hill billies stormed the capital this year.

    (i use this term half in jest, and half to describe rural country folk surrounding the capital and acting as their own political agents. I am not using the term “hill billy” in a disparaging way)

    It was cause for alarm amongst the urban petit bourgeoise. On the ground in Kathmandu I was talking with a comrade… At the time I felt that the leadership of the Maoist’s was giving far too much consideration to the sentiments of the urban middle class. I said (and still say)- it is going to be easy to ask for their forgiveness, but we shouldn’t ever ask for their permission…

    I digress though. A peasant mass- met up with a urban base- they got to know one another as countrymen over the week long general strike. They were and are part of the same mass movement. This movement has a communist political wing, a parlimenatary wing, a military, a militia, a street force, and a country side force. Sum total- they are The Maobadi. The whole is greater than the sum of it’s parts.

    When it comes to detail’s and gun’s- I am not expert, and no one on this site is. My understanding is the Maoist’s registered under 6000 guns with the UN. During the coarse of the peoples war- the maoist’s stole about just under 6000 guns. There are a few report’s that are suspicious of the gun count. Many feel the Maoist’s have not disclosed entirely the number of firearms they command and control. The count- hey, the UN can make their own. Or it can be decided in armed conflict … nevertheless.

    If we accept the UN registered gun count- approx 3 out of 4 combattant’s would be training with wood rifles. It’s almost funny. Ka Frank is looking at all the same data, and is speaking negatively of circumstance and is critical of material force on hand- at the same time with toungue in cheek is vehemenently critical of the Maoist’s in Nepal for fudging the numbers and playing the game of real poliitks. I for one argue here- ideology- does not mean being truthful with the ruling class. We can and should- throw some rocks, and hide our hands.

    gotta eat- more later

  14. Ben said

    Revolutionary ideology is about being truthful with the revolutionary masses about line and strategy; tactics in the field may vary according to concrete circumstances which may change according to changes in the tactical manuevers used by the enemy.

    In a people’s war, matters of tactics have to be left to field commanders to decide in close consultation with the party political commisar but when it comes to line and strategy of who’s friend and who’s enemy and who to strategically rely on for essential military intelligence in the field, it’s the party line and strategy laid down by the party central military commision that must be adhered to. Let’s take a look at how commanders in a people’s army are appointed. Commanders from the level of a company and battalion has to be approved by the party branch of the military unit. Appointments of commanders for larger military formations such as brigades and above have to be approved by the party central military commission. Every military unit from the level of company and above will have a party political commisar to ensure that unit commanders adhere to the line and strategy laid down by the party center. In a word, the party must have absolute command and control over the people’s army not anyone else outside the party. Relinquishing command and control of the people’s army to the enemy amounts to handing over the armed might of the people to the enemy leaving the revolutionary masses defenseless against any enemy armed attacks.

    That’s why Mao summed up this long bitter historical lesson in these words: “… without a people’s army, the people have nothing …”. It’s not some empty rhetoric or mantra.

  15. jon said

    why have people given up on the Nepali revolution? (apart from this site of course) the rcp, Joseph ball ridiculous criticism, and so forth. the nepali maoists are doing revolution in a new way, so let us watch and learn.

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