Revolution in South Asia

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Debate Among Nepal’s Maoists: Bhattarai’s Approach to Restructuring of Nepal

Posted by D and I Consulting on March 30, 2011

Maoist supporter outside voting station, April 2008.

The following speech is by Baburam Bhattarai, one of the Vice Chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Bhattarai is generally associated with a current who believes the situation is unfavorable for seizing power.

Bhattarai presented this speech – “Post-Conflict Restructuring of Nepal: The Challenges and Prospects” –  on March 26 at  the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore.

We would like to point out to our readers that the views in this speech do not reflect the line of the UCPN(M) overall. Public statements by other Maoist leaders such as Kiran and Prachanda have pointed to different views.

We provide this speech in one piece, and emphasize that this does not imply endorsement of the views presented, but we share for the purpose of informing our readers. This originally appeared in two pieces from ekantipur.com here and here.

Post-conflict restructuring of Nepal: The Challenges and Prospects

The conflict or social class struggle in Nepal so far has been the fight of the overwhelming majority of  people subjected to class, nationality, regional, gender and caste oppression by a feudal, autocratic, unitary state system backed by internal and external retrograde forces. In other words, the struggle is for complete democratisation of society, economy and polity of the country. Hence  post-conflict peace and development can be achieved only by total restructuring of all existing political, economic, social, cultural and international relations on a democratic basis.

a) Democratic restructuring

The most fundamental and perhaps the most important question in the current peace process in Nepal is that of finding a mutually acceptable model of democratic system of the state to be institutionalised through the CA. The traditional parliamentary forces and Maoist communist revolutionaries had joined hands since the 12-Point Understanding to abolish the monarchy and introduce a democratic state system through an elected CA. There was a basic agreement on the process of institutionalising democracy, but not on the content or form of democracy. As is well known, the bourgeois democratic forces subscribe to liberal democracy, whereas the communist revolutionaries aspire for people’s democracy or socialist democracy. This great ideological-political divide is so deep-rooted in Nepal that the prolonged impasse in the constitution drafting process in the CA basically hinges on this.

There is general agreement in the Maoist radical democratic camp that principal impediments to social progress in  present-day Nepal are the feudal remnants in different spheres of society, economy and state. Hence the UCPN (Maoist) has identified its principal immediate task as the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Furthermore, the party has already declared its commitment to multi-party competitive politics, periodic elections, freedom of press and assembly, rule of law, human rights, etc, which are considered inalienable features of liberal democracy. The party’s only insistence has been that this political democracy should be grounded on concomitant democracy on economic, social and cultural fronts so that the basic masses of workers, peasants, women, dalits and people of oppressed nationalities and regions, too, can avail the real fruits of democracy.

For this, certain specific measures to ensure the real participation of the basic masses of people in the state organs should be enshrined in the very constitution. As A.D. Benoit has rightly said, “The highest measure of democracy is neither the ‘extent of freedom’ nor the ‘extent of equality’, but rather the highest measure of participation”. Similarly, fundamental rights to education, health, employment, food security, shelter, etc., should be guaranteed to every citizen by the constitution.

The liberal democratic camp led by the Nepali Congress, however, has so far not exhibited much ingenuity and flexibility to develop a realistic model of democracy suited to the specific conditions of the country, apart from harping on the traditional model of parliamentary democracy of the Westminister type. The prolonged deadlock over the form of governance, whether the presidential or the prime ministerial system, is its direct manifestation. Since both sides have more or less unified understanding about the need to sweep away all feudal remnants and complete the democratic revolution, it would be prudent to unitedly develop a transitional model of democracy incorporating the positive features of both liberal and socialist/people’s democracy.

Baburam Bhattarai

b) Federal restructuring

Though Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-regional, multi-religious and multi-cultural country, it has been ruled by a unitary and centralised state system dominated by the hill Arya-Khas nationality with Kathmandu as the centre of power. The Maoist People’s War, the United People’s Movement, the Madhesi Movement and various Nationality Movements in different periods of time had federal restructuring of the state as a common agenda. Federal restructuring of the state, therefore, should be an important component of overall restructuring of Nepal in the post-conflict phase.

Even if there is general consensus in the country about the need for restructuring the current unitary state along federal lines, there are divergent views and positions on the modality of federalism. The traditional parliamentary democratic parties are still dragging their feet on the issue of federal restructuring. There is a distinct polarisation between the UCPN (Maoist), Madhesis parties and other janajati parties, on the one hand, and the parliamentary democratic parties, on the other, on this crucial issue, which threatens to wreck the whole constitution-making process. As there are multiple nationalities within the country, like the Madhesis and others, and there are regions with their own distinct identity, like the far-western Seti-Mahakali and Karnali regions, the basis of federalism should be the national and regional identity with adequate autonomy. Accordingly, UCPN (Maoist) has proposed 12 federal units, but has remained somewhat flexible on the number of units.

There is a need to be cautious and guard against two extreme positions on the question of federalism. While, on the one hand, the parliamentary democratic parties are virtually against federalism by denying national, regional or linguistic identity of oppressed nationalities and regions, some of the Madhesi and other janajati parties, on the other, over-emphasise the ethnic identity and border on separatism while talking of federalism. Both of these are erroneous and extremely dangerous positions, which unwittingly feed on each other to wreck the federal restructuring of the state and the ultimate constitution-making process.

Also, Special Rights to compensate for past oppression against women, dalits and Muslims have to be enshrined in the new constitution.

c) Restructuring of security sector

Security forces, including the army, paramilitary and police, are indispensable and the most important component of any state system. Hence, any democratic restructuring of the state is unthinkable without the accompanying restructuring of the security sector, principally the security forces.

There are two aspects of restructuring of the security sector in the post-conflict context of Nepal. One is the democratisation of the traditional Nepal Army (NA) and the other is the integration and rehabilitation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to the CPA.

After the successful anti-monarchy democratic movement of April 2006, a special provision was inserted ‘to democratise’ the NA in the CPA signed in November 2006. This was also incorporated in the Interim Constitution,
2006. By ‘democratisation’ it was meant “to fix the appropriate size, to create democratic structure, to introduce national and inclusive character and to train it with the values of democracy and human rights.” It was a calculated move to restructure the entire security forces so that the Army may not be used against the people and democracy as was done in the past. Unfortunately no tangible progress has been made to democratise the NA so far, and rather the leadership of the parliamentary parties are vying with each other to pamper the NA in its original form.

Another cardinal question is the integration and rehabilitation of the PLA. If making of the new constitution through the CA is the most important political dimension of the peace process then the integration and rehabilitation of the PLA is an equally, if not more, important military dimension of the peace process. One cannot be completed without the other. Unfortunately the progress on the PLA front has been glacial. There have been irresponsible remarks from the leaders of parliamentary parties, including the concerned Ministers, against the spirit of integration, as if it is equivalent of individual recruitment into the security forces. As the PLA was politically victorious and not defeated militarily, we have to devise our own indigenous modality of its integration into the security forces.
Among the various options proposed by the UCPN (Maoist) are: the creation of a separate force, or a mixed force with matching numbers from other forces, or integration into different security forces including the NA, Armed Police Force and the civilian

Nepal Police. Whatever modality is followed, there is no alternative to integration of the PLA. If it is not handled correctly, it could prove the ultimate flash point for the breakdown of the peace process. Restructuring of the security sector also entails the formulation of an overall security policy of the country to suit the new democratic restructuring internally and to keep up with the changing security dynamics externally.

Restructuring the economy

The ultimate objective cause of any social or political conflict is the economy. The 10 years of armed conflict was fuelled by rampant poverty, unemployment, inequality and dependency. It is, therefore, imperative that the prevailing semi-feudal and semi-colonial socio-economic formation be restructured progressively. Transformation of the traditional agriculture sector into a modern industrial sector should top the agenda of economic restructuring. A radical land-reform programme with judicious redistribution of land and promotion of modern farming systems should be implemented.

Promotion of cooperatives among small producers should ensure reasonable growth with substantial social equity. The next focus should be a campaign of national industrialisation based on the principle of public-private partnership. The current Kathmandu-centric development model must be reversed to make maximum utilisation of local resources and potentials. Also, Nepal should follow a strategy of taking maximum advantage of the rapid economic development of both China and India. Only through a strategy of rapid economic restructuring and development can the democratic change be sustained and institutionalised. Democracy amidst rampant poverty, unemployment and inequality will be ever susceptible to revert to autocracy.

Restructuring of international relations

The internal dynamics of Nepal have been largely conditioned by external dynamics, particularly that of India. Because of its sensitive geo-strategic position between two giant neighbours, it has attracted disproportionate attention from international power centres.

Now with democratic transition in Nepal and the rapid growth trajectory pursued by both India and China, the traditional notion of an inanimate and static ‘buffer zone’ may be discarded in favour of a vibrant bridge between the two neighbours. This calls for change of old perceptions on the part of both Nepal and its immediate neighbours. Though China and the US both have some strategic interests in Nepal, it is India that has larger interests, both in strategic and economic sense. Hence relations with India demand more careful consideration and restructuring to suit the mutual interests in the new context.

First of all, the historically developed dominance-dependence relationship with India needs to be restructured in favour of an equal and mutually beneficial relation. With the economic might India has acquired and the democratic transition Nepal has undergone in recent times, it is no longer necessary and prudent for India to try to maintain its influence in Nepal through force. Also, a democratic Nepal is the best bet for safeguarding genuine Indian interests here. UCPN (Maoist) being the largest political formation should be in a better position to assure India of this. Unfortunately the relations between the UCPN (Maoist) leadership and India have further soured to the detriment of both in recent times.

However, as India has played a very significant role in promoting the current peace and democratic process and peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in Nepal will ultimately benefit India, it is in the enlightened self-interest of India to assist the current peace process reach a successful conclusion. The dominant public perception that the Indian establishment may not be very happy with the emergence of the Maoist forces as leading political actors in the neighbourhood has helped neither side. As long as the Maoists play by the rules of the game as defined in the CPA and other agreements and contribute to promote stability with change and prosperity, it may be better for India to encourage, rather than to stall, the peace process, irrespective of whoever is at the helm in Nepal. On the Maoist side, it may be more prudent to try to restructure the relationionship with India for mutual benefit through political and diplomatic means than to choose the path of confrontation.

Nepal’s relationship with China has remained more or less frictionless over a long period of time. However, with the emergence of China as a global economic and military power and recent democratic changes in Nepal, it is quite natural for China to try to expand its influence south of the Himalayas, especially for safeguarding the security of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This may lead to an increased rivalry between India and China to keep Nepal under their area of influence. As the US, the sole superpower of the world, too, may try to maintain its strategic hold in this sensitive geo-strategic zone, there may ensure a triangular contention between international power centres for supremacy over Nepal. But geographically, economically, socially and culturally, India enjoys a distinct advantage vis-à-vis its other rivals in the country. In this context, it is imperative for Nepal to restructure its foreign policy according to the changing dynamics in the region and especially maintain objective and balanced relations with its immediate neighbours. Any policy of courting one neighbour at the cost of the other may be counter-productive for the country’s national interests.

The prospects

The current political deadlock in Nepal can end one of two ways.

In the first scenario, the traditional parliamentary democratic forces led by the Nepali Congress and backed by the international status-quoist forces, may defeat the proletarian democratic forces led by the UCPN (Maoist) and impose the traditional bourgeois democratic system. Though this probability cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely on two counts. On the one hand, it cannot fulfill the objective necessity of progressive restructuring of the Nepali state, society and economy for which the masses of the people have struggled for more than six decades, and the other, the political balance of forces in Nepal over the past decades has decisively taken a left turn, which has been clearly manifested in the CA elections as more than 62 percent of seats were won by left candidates. As for the probability of a Maoist revolutionary takeover at the cost of the parliamentary forces, the existing internal military balance and international situation do not favour this and it can be safely ruled out for the moment, though there are occasional reports of an impending ‘people’s revolt’ led by the UCPN (Maoist).

The second scenario would be a new historical compromise between the two contending political forces, i.e. parliamentary democrats and Maoist revolutionaries, to take the peace process to a successful conclusion and make a new constitution through the CA to restructure the state, society and economy. Given the current stage of development of the Nepali society transiting from feudalism to capitalism and the prevailing balance of political forces both internally and externally, this is a historical necessity and the most sensible political move on both sides. Of course, the agreement should be for progressive restructuring of state, society and economy, and not for maintaining the status quo.

For this, the UCPN (Maoist) and the Nepali Congress should take the lead of the respective camps overcoming the serious trust deficit on both sides at the moment, which needs to be backed by international actors, particularly India and China. Agreement on basic content of the new constitution, including a suitable model of democracy, federal restructuring of the state, form of governance etc, and the modality of army integration, should form the cornerstone of the new political understanding.

The third and the most undesirable prospect would be the breakdown of the peace process and the constitution-making process and relapse of the country into a new phase of armed confrontation. The scenario would be the most alarming as it is likely to trigger a regional conflict with involvement of the immediate neighbours, India and China, and also other international power centres, for example, Afghanistan. This needs to be avoided at any cost. Otherwise we may be cursed by history. As George Santayana had rightly said, “Those who cannot remember history are condemned to repeat it.”

19 Responses to “Debate Among Nepal’s Maoists: Bhattarai’s Approach to Restructuring of Nepal”

  1. maitri said

    if this is correct, and i think it is, then there is no revolution in Nepal. what do others think?

  2. maitri said

    Bhattarai does not seem to take the prospect of a ‘peoples revolt’ that seriously:

    ‘As for the probability of a Maoist revolutionary takeover at the cost of the parliamentary forces, the existing internal military balance and international situation do not favour this and it can be safely ruled out for the moment, though there are occasional reports of an impending ‘people’s revolt’ led by the UCPN (Maoist).’

    Would the Nepali comrades agree with the above statement, or do they think that there can be a ‘peoples revolt’ led by the Maoists?

  3. Alastair Reith said

    This is the view of one leader of the Nepali revolutionary movement. His views are opposed by other leaders and large sections of the cadres – from what we saw at the Palungtar plenum, the majority of the party opposes the views of Bhattarai.

  4. maitri said

    maybe they do, but what is the political line of the Nepali Maoists? it is, as far as i can tell, Bhattarai’s line. It would be useful for people to know what is Prachanda’s and Kiran’s line, because they do not seem so different to Bhattarai’s in substance.

  5. Friend Alastair, yes, I agree with you . Majority of the party oppose the vies and line of Bhattaria. After all Bhaittarai is pleading the multy party system that is Bihari Ganatranta. In fact a small section of cadres support Bhaittairai’s vies and line . Bhattairai believes in propaganda only.

  6. maitri said

    Rishi- But is bhattarai’s line the line of the party? what substantial difference is there between bhattarai and prachandas line?

  7. siva said

    The implicit charge against Bhatttarai by his critics within the party is that he is deviating from the party line.
    In a disciplined party there are ways to conduct debates.
    It is not for public entertainment.
    We are all aware that Bhattarai’s line is in the minority. He is trying to drum up support for it by weakening the case for revolution and plugging a pro-Indian line.
    I doubt his succeeding in his efforts. So far the signs are that way.
    It may not be a bad thing for the Maoists to play along with the CA and its attempts at new constitution and thus expose that the Congress and the UML are not for serious democratic and social reform.
    Meantime the party has to ready itself for struggle. That is what Baidya demands.

  8. //It would be useful for people to know what is Prachanda’s and Kiran’s line, because they do not seem so different to Bhattarai’s in substance.//

    Kiran and Prachanda united at Palungtar and the official line of the UCPN (M) is now to simultaneously push for the completion of a constitution by May 28th while also preparing for a people’s revolt.

    Bhattarai is advocating that the deadline be extended again – Kiran and Prachanda appear to reject this.

  9. Kumar Sarkar said

    There are two aspects in dealing with Comrade Bhattarai’s recent lecture given at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore:

    a. The speech is given at a time when the UCPN (Maoist) has characterised the present stage of the Nepalese struggle as the final ‘offensive stage’.

    b. The latest resolution of the Party decided on the need for the preparation of an insurrection with a view to a possible non-completion of the constitution making process by the CA.

    It is, of course, up to the UCPN (Maoist) to decide whether or not an insurrection is the final necessary step, and, if so, whether or not to start preparation for it now. It is also up to the UCPN (Maoist) to decide whether or not to continue debates on the issue even after a decision has been made one way or the other.

    However, it is our internationalist duty to deal with the political issues raised in a general manner, without posing to intervene in the decision making process of the UCPN(Maoist).

    Bhattarai’s thesis deals with, what he conceives as, three scenarios to follow from the existing political situation in Nepal:

    a. Bhattarai observes: “In the first scenario, the traditional parliamentary democratic forces led by the Nepali Congress and backed by the international status-quoist forces, may defeat the proletarian democratic forces led by the UCPN (Maoist) and impose the traditional bourgeois democratic system”. This probability, Bhattarai argues, is unlikely because it cannot fulfill the objective necessity of progressive restructuring of the Nepali state, society and economy for which the people have fought. The other reason is the political balance of forces in Nepal over the past decades, which has decisively taken a left turn. As for the probability of a Maoist revolutionary takeover at the cost of the parliamentary forces, the existing internal military balance and international situation do not favour this and it can be safely ruled out for the moment, though there are occasional reports of an impending ‘people’s revolt’ led by the UCPN (Maoist)”

    b. Hence, Bhattarai recommends: “The second scenario would be a new historical compromise between the two contending political forces, i.e. parliamentary democrats and Maoist revolutionaries, to take the peace process to a successful conclusion and make a new constitution through the CA to restructure the state, society and economy.”

    c. Bhattarai cautions; “The third and the most undesirable prospect would be the breakdown of the peace process and the constitution-making process and relapse of the country into a new phase of armed confrontation. The scenario would be the most alarming as it is likely to trigger a regional conflict with involvement of the immediate neighbours, India and China, and also other international power centres, for example, Afghanistan. This needs to be avoided at any cost. Otherwise we may be cursed by history”

    The a and c seem to be part of the same scenario.

    From the thesis, as presented by Bhattarai, the following issues can be raised:

    1. If the “probability of a Maoist revolutionary takeover at the cost of the parliamentary forces” is not desirable, why then the People’s War was launched? If the basis of the present realisation did not exist when it was launched, how did it change later? Or, if the realisation now that it was an adventurist mistake, would Bhattarai ask the party to make a self-criticism for the loss of 18,000 lives?

    2. The latest chemistry of the international situation indicates that the balance of class forces in Europe, America and the Middle East is going through massive changes in favour of the working class and oppressed people. It seems improbable in this situation of financial uncertainty that the US would intervene in any place for only strategic benefits not associated with direct plunder of natural resources. If the success of the Nepalese Revolution requires, as it does, regionalisation of the revolution, then the logical course to follow is to co-ordinate with the Maoist revolutionary forces in India and vitalise the CCOMPOSA.

    3. Let us look into the “historic compromise” in “total restructuring of all existing political, economic, social, cultural and international relations on a democratic basis” that Bhattarai is recommending for the UCPN (Maoist) to make, by focussing on democracy and economy.
    Bhattarai observes:
    “As is well known, the bourgeois democratic forces subscribe to liberal democracy, whereas the communist revolutionaries aspire for people’s democracy or socialist democracy. This great ideological-political divide is so deep-rooted in Nepal that the prolonged impasse in the constitution drafting process in the CA basically hinges on this.”
    “Since both sides have more or less unified understanding about the need to sweep away all feudal remnants and complete the democratic revolution, it would be prudent to unitedly develop a transitional model of democracy incorporating the positive features of both liberal and socialist/people’s democracy.”
    These are astounding positions! First, the Nepal Congress Party is characterised as a ‘liberal bourgeois democratic’ force and not a pro-India comprador force. Second, India is considered as a ‘status-quoist’ force and not expansionist. Third, the assessment is that both sides ‘want to complete the democratic revolution’. If the NCP were a ‘liberal bourgeois force’, even then to expect them to complete the democratic revolution goes against all the teachings on the subject by Lenin and Mao. Does Bhattarai want us to forget that we are not living in the age of independent democratic revolutions led by the anti-feudal rising bourgeoisie of Europe during the middle of the 19th century? Bhattarai’s “liberal democrats” of the Nepal Congress Party will not, and cannot, take Nepal on a liberal democratic path as required by its post-feudal development. Apart from the fact that the liberal democratic bourgeoisie, if they now exist anywhere in semi-feudal societies, has long since lost the ability to lead modern democratic revolutions since DEMOCRACY HAS LONG BEEN DECAYING FROM WHERE IT SPREAD.

    With these false premises, Bhattarai offers a hypothetical blueprint for an inconceivable situation that would ensure “Transformation of the traditional agriculture sector into a modern industrial sector” ‘topping the agenda of economic restructuring’. The independent democratic revolution of mid- Nineteenth century Europe did not end up in “economic restructuring”, it smashed the existing feudal economy, replacing it with industrial economy. In today’s globalised capitalism, with worst ever deepening crisis, there is no scope for independent “economic restructuring”. Moreover, the concept of ‘economic restructuring’ via a ‘democratic revolution’ is a strange concept indeed! ‘Transformation of the traditional agriculture sector into a modern industrial sector’ can not be a ‘process of restructuring’, it does require a revolutionary process as it was required originally in Europe.

    In fact, Bhattarai has muddled up ‘completion of the democratic revolution’ with “a transitional model of democracy incorporating the positive features of both liberal and socialist/people’s democracy. “ Wishful thinking indeed!!

    4. As for “the existing internal military balance” we must leave that to the UCPN (Maoist) to assess.

  10. maitri said

    a question:
    is kiran’s line and prachanda’s line the same?

  11. @ Maitri: The bourgeois media cannot be trusted (of course), but this news report from just after the Palungtar plenum seems accurate as far as I can tell. It explains some of the differences between the three leaders.

    http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=26269

  12. Rajesh said

    In my understanding,UCPN (M)has two political lines – Kiran’s line of people’s revolt and Bhattarai’s line of peaceful transition (by completing the task of constitution writing) to multi-party bourgeois democracy.

    Kiran is trying his best to bring the party back to revolutionary path and he has put forward the tactical line of People’s Revolt. His political line has the basic elements, which could reestablish the revolutionary credential of the party. However, in practice, he has serious limitations that resulted from the compromises he has been having with a champion of no-line and a torch bearer of opposite political line. Hence, he is loosing his political relevance.

    On the other side, Bhattarai clearly, though not openly has taken the political line, which was advanced by CPN (UML) leader Madan Bhandari in 1990s. This line is simply negates the need of revolution in Nepal and puts forward the “multi-party democracy” as the new MANTRA for people’s liberation.

    And, Prachanda is free from any political line. This may sound strange. He is the expert in making some sort of mechanical mixture of the two lines mentioned above. He presents that mixture to the party and the larger public, branding it as a chemical compound. Hence, he is a free man and at the same time he is a leader. Therefore, it is unproductive to try dig deep to find out his political line.

  13. maitri said

    thanks Rajesh, informative as usual. It seems to me that Kiran has no real plan,but Bhattarai has a well thought out plan, but unfortunately its a revisionist one.Also, Kiran strikes me as a theorist, but not a leader, while Prachanda is a leader but not a theorist.

  14. Alastair Reith said

    @ Maitri:

    “it seems” that you are making a lot of very definitive statements about Kiran and Prachanda. what do you base this on? Why do you say Kiran has “no real plan”? Why is he a “theorist”, but not a “leader”? And why is the reverse true for Prachanda? You cannot simply throw around such statements and provide no evidence to back them up.

    If the party is preparing for a people’s revolt, as Kiran advocates, do you really think they would make public their plans?

  15. maitri said

    aleister,

    i have sources other than kasama. btw can you spoeak nepali? I can and the so called ‘revolution’ looks a lot different if you really know what is happening and not desperately hoping for an insurrection to justify your website.

  16. maitri said

    do you really believe the party can do an insurrection in ‘secret’ and that the UN, US, India etc would not know. Ha! ha! ha!

  17. Alastair Reith said

    You are asking us to trust a faceless name that refuses to provide evidence. We do not know you. We do not have any obligation to believe your assertions whether or not you speak Nepali.

    No, I do not speak that language. I have never been to Nepal. But I have spent a lot of time over the past five years studying news reports from Nepal, talking to people who have been there, reading about Nepali history and studying the documents of the Maoist party and its various leaders (and the different lines they represent).

    The fact that you speak Nepali is irrelevant. I know many people who speak Nepali were born in Nepal, and who are also convinced a revolutionary movement exists in Nepal and that a succesful revolution is possible. If you want us to take your beliefs seriously, provide some evidence for them. Justify your position.

    The UCPN (M) is experiencing sharp internal divisions that are being reflected in the party’s mass organisations (the recent turmoil in the ANTUF, the heated debates at Palungtar etc). There are different currents within the party – some calling for immediate preparations for a revolt, some saying a revolt is impossible. It is not yet known how these different wings of the party will act in the crucial months ahead, as yet another constitutional deadline approaches.

    I believe, as do the other moderators of this site, that a succesful revolution is possible in Nepal. I do not believe it is inevitable. I do know when it will happen or how it will happen, but I believe it is a well established fact that Nepal is more ripe for revolution than any other country in the world today. That’s all the ‘justification’ we need to keep this website going.

    You ask whether I believe an insurrection can take place in secret. Of course I don’t believe that. It is not taking place in secret. The consternation of the Nepali bourgeois forces and their foreign backers when the Palungtar plenum endorsed a strategy of people’s revolt is no secret. The existence of a People’s Army in Nepal is no secret. The existence of a politically aware, very radical and millions-strong mass base for the revolutionary party is no secret. The formation of the People’s Volunteers, led by Biplap, is just another indication that there are preparations being made for a possible revolt and that the pro-revolt current within the party is in ascendancy.

    My question to you is this – if the Maoists were really preparing for a revolt, in a period when there is a great deal of speculation about this and many very real dangers to the revolutionary movement, do you really expect them to confirm this revolt in advance and publicly release their plans?

  18. […] government during the People’s War. He opposes a strategy of people’s revolt, arguing the international and domestic situation makes the success of such a revolt impossible. Instead he […]

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